Lecture Notes on Thomson's "A Defense of Abortion"

1. Popular thought experiment floating around on the internet (I'll describe it): what, if anything, does it show?

One possible formulation of the implicit argument:

• Any action that would result in the failure of such good and important people (e.g. Beethoven, Jesus) to come into existence must be wrong.
• But abortions, under the kinds of circumstances described, are actions that would have resulted in the failure of such good and important people to come into existence, representing a tragic loss.

_________

• Therefore, abortions, under the kinds of circumstances described, must be wrong.

Problems with the argument: while the argument is logically valid, the first premise is problematic.

A refuting case.

Problems with other ways of understanding the thought experiment: it still doesn't show anything more than what is already obvious, namely that it is possible (even if not statistically likely) for people born in very bad circumstances to have wonderful lives. This does not address what is really at issue in most cases.

2. Preface to discussion: A distinction between two kinds of questions about abortion from a moral point of view:

• Under what circumstances, if any, are particular acts of abortion morally justifiable, just considered in themselves? And why?
• What kinds of laws and social policies should there be regarding abortion?

We'll keep our focus mainly on the first question, though the second is extremely important, especially to the political debate.

3. Thomson wants to undermine the argument that abortion is always wrong because it violates the fetus's right to life.

Two possible strategies in attacking that argument:

(i) Deny that a fetus has a full right to life.

(ii) Grant that a fetus has a full right to life, but argue that its right to life isn't violated by an act of abortion.

Thomson adopts the second strategy (granting for the sake of argument that a fetus has a full right to life).

4. What does a right to life entail? What does it not entail? Be sure you're clear about this. Illustration: Violinist Example (740).

5. The Modified Violinist Example: add the element of voluntary risk, to broaden the relevance of the case to non-rape abortion cases. (Question: does this really capture the idea of voluntary risk in a way that is analogous to the case of getting pregnant?)

6. Does Thomson's argument, using the Modified Violinist Example, succeed? Problem: It seems to conflate positive and negative rights, and that would ruin the analogy between this case and abortion cases. I'll explain this.

7. Two Kinds of Rights and Duties

See Foot's article on Killing and Letting Die, and our detailed discussion of it in lecture:

Brief review:

Positive rights: rights to ____________________________. Positive duties: duties to _____________________________________.

Negative rights: rights not to ___________________________, such as _____________________________. Negative duties: duties not to ____________________________, such as ________________________.

Notice that negative rights or duties seem to be more stringent than positive rights or duties, all else being equal. E.g. Transplant Case. Review the material on Foot to see what this claim of greater stringency means.

8. What kind of rights or duties are at issue in the case of the violinist? What kind of rights or duties are at issue in the abortion case? Are they the same (as Thomson's use of the case as an alleged parallel requires)?

Consider: If you unhook yourself from the violinist, are you straightforwardly killing him, or more fundamentally just ceasing to save him from a pre-existing ailment, which is what he then dies of? By contrast, if you expel a fetus, are you merely ceasing to save it from some pre-existing ailment?

9. Lesson: It may be very difficult to argue convincingly for the moral permissibility of abortion (except perhaps in extreme cases) if it is granted that a fetus has a full right to life, and therefore a full negative right not to be killed. A more promising strategy for defending the moral permissibility of at least a certain range of abortions would be to return to the question of the moral status of the fetus, and to question whether it can really be said to have a full right to life. Perhaps, for example, a full right to life is something that emerges only gradually, reaching completion only at some point around viability or upon birth, rather than being possessed from the start by a fertilized egg. We've already discussed this possible Gradualist View when discussing embryonic stem cell research.