Notes on Biotechnology Beyond Therapy
1. A Question (generalizing from Watson's question): If we could make better human beings and better human lives through applications of biotechnologies, why shouldn't we?
2. What are some ways in which we
already do this?
3. Does this sort of interference with the order of nature
constitute 'playing God' in any problematic sense?
4. Digression: Follow-up on
euthanasia and the use of biotechnology to end
life.
Rachels
and Foot on voluntary euthanasia
under extreme circumstances.
Foot on
the waiving of the negative right not
to be killed (or of the doctor's
negative duty not to kill one). Note that this is meant to be possible only
under very special circumstances.
Question:
Does this use of biotechnology constitute 'playing God' in any
problematic sense?
o What is the thought here?
o A joke and a counter-thought.
o What does 'respecting life' involve? Are we called upon primarily to respect
life, or to respect persons? And can respecting persons sometimes involve
ending life?
5. Ethical Issues Surrounding Some 'Beyond Therapy' Uses of Biotechnology
Once we move beyond curing diseases, what is our
standard for measuring what counts as making life better for us, which is the goal of enhancement technologies? Do we
have any clear conception of it?
Simple
hypothetical example: basketball and imaginary genetic enhancement. What would
that get us?
Making ourselves better at certain things vs.
making things better for us.
Do we have a clear understanding of what an ideal life would look like, to serve as
something to strive toward? If not, are we sure that in pursuing certain
enhancements we're really effectively pursuing our ultimate goal?
Consider ways in which technology generally has
made our lives easier by changing our circumstances. By doing that, it has
changed the activities we fill our time
with. Is that always or on the whole an improvement
to our lives and to ourselves? Cf. Wendell Berry's "What Are People
For?"
Consider next how technologies have led to changes
more directly to ourselves.
o E.g.,
use of steroids in athletics.
o What
exactly have we gained? Again, consider the distinction between making ourselves
better at certain things vs. making things
better for us.
o What kind of value do our goals (such as athletic goals) have? Intrinsic? Or
only value in the context of human strivings with our native abilities?
o But where do we draw the line? Can we
articulate this in a general way?
But what
is so sacrosanct about our native abilities or their genetic basis, either
individually or as a species, given what we now know about their origins? Why shouldn't we change things for the better if we can,
given that nature has no plausible authority over us?
Again,
however, there are deeper worries about what really will make things better, and what that amounts to. Cf.
Huxley's Brave New World.
o Question: Do we owe it to our children to
make them the best they can be? Some worries:
o The medicalization
of childhood. Is something important being lost?
o Mood-altering and personality-altering drugs:
what are some dangers in the context of enhancement?