MacIntyre on Virtues, Practices and Internal Goods
1. A general and traditional definition of the moral virtues: traits of character that ___________________________________.
2. Can we say something more specific about what makes something count as a moral virtue, and how exactly virtues contribute to human flourishing?
3. MacIntyre's Account of the Moral Virtues (Core Conception). I'll present a diagram of this during lecture.
4. What is a Practice? (Make sure you can answer this in some depth.)
5. What are Goods Internal to a Practice? How Do They Differ from Goods External to a Practice? (Again, make sure you can answer this in depth.)
Note: (1) Don't confuse either goods internal to practices, or moral virtues, with the particular skills relevant to a practice. These are three separate, though related, categories--as made clear in the diagram I'll provide in lecture.
(2) Don't get confused by the terminology: I will often refer to "goods internal to a practice" simply as "internal goods" for short, but "internal" here still means "internal to some practice", in MacIntyre's sense--not "internal to the person" (even though they often are). Some internal goods are social in nature, and so are not internal to each person; the point is that they're internal to a practice in MacIntyre's sense, as opposed to being external to it. The important point is to be clear about the distinction between the internal and the external in relation to practices. Be sure you can explain this.
6. Human Flourishing and Internal Goods.
7. Example of a Practice: Oscar Peterson Trio.
8. The Role of the Virtues in Practices:
9. Internal Goods and Careers; and Family.
10. Example of how goods internal to a given practice may have wider significance in life: checkers with my wife's grandfather in the last years of his life.
SOME CRITICAL QUESTIONS:
12. How might MacIntyre respond to the following objection? "Isn't it obvious that there can be people who excel in a particular practice, such as basketball or playing the violin, even though they're far from morally virtuous? Not only can they be excellent at the practice, but it seems they can certainly enjoy at least some goods internal to the practice, even without moral virtues."
13. MacIntyre admits that moral virtues may be put to bad use: e.g. the courageous terrorist. But isn't there still a way that we can draw an important general connection between possessing the moral virtues and living morally? (I think so, and I'll explain why in class, either this time or next time.)
14. Does MacIntyre's account of virtues in terms of practices imply moral relativism? Aren't some practices bad, after all? What does he have to say about bad practices? Can his account still provide a non-relative account of the moral virtues? (I think it may, and I'll explain why in class.)
Just to think about and keep in mind later when you read Mill:
15. Internal Goods, Pleasure and Values: "Internal pleasures" (pleasures internal to a practice) are themselves dependent on the prior values bound up with the relevant practices; so pleasure apparently cannot itself be the only value, or the source of all value, as hedonists like Mill claim.