Contemporary
Normative Ethics
PHILOSOPHY 5334 (97386)
Fall, 2009
Instructor: William J. FitzPatrick
Office/Hours: 237 Major Williams Hall; 231-7543; email: william.fitzpatrick@vt.edu; Hours: Wednesdays 2:00-4:00, or by appointment.
Seminar Meetings: Thursdays, 2:00-4:45, 225 Major Williams Hall
Readings:
(A) Books:
(1) The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory (OH), ed. David Copp (Oxford University Press, 2006).
(2) Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame (MD) by Thomas Scanlon (Harvard University Press, 2008).
(B) Articles:
I will provide a number of articles for you to copy in the Monad as we go along, and we will also make use of JSTOR for several articles, cutting down on the expense of a course reader. To use JSTOR, go to www.jstor.org , select "Search", type in the title for a title search, and select 'Philosophy' in the journals section.
Course Description: A systematic examination of normative ethics, the part of moral philosophy concerned with questions about what is right and good: What factors contribute to the rightness or wrongness of actions? What distinctions are important when thinking about moral issues? What general principles about rightness and goodness, if any, can we formulate and defend? How do these principles apply to various practical issues?
The approach will be ahistorical, focusing on the central work of many of the most prominent contemporary moral philosophers working in the areas of consequentialism, non-consequentialism, Kantian ethical theory, and virtue ethics, among others. Particular attention will be paid to the distinctions (i) between killing and letting die, and (ii) between harm that is intended as a means to some good end and harm that is merely a foreseen but unintended side-effect of some means taken toward a good end (which raises broader questions about the role of intention in normative ethics). We will also look at some of their applications to current issues, such as euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide, or the moral distinction between tactical bombing in war and acts of terrorism. In the course of examining the debate between consequentialists (e.g., utilitarians) and non-consequentialists, we will examine attempts to formulate and justify deontological constraints (and related claims about human rights) based on these and other distinctions, and attempts to formulate and justify non-consequentialist "prerogatives" or "options", which speaks to the question of what limits, if any, there are to the demands morality may make on our lives. Some other issues to be examined: the methodological role of 'intuitions' in normative ethics and challenges from recent empirical moral psychology (e.g., in connection with 'trolley problems'); the concepts of character and moral virtues, and challenges from 'situationist' work in empirical psychology; the existence and nature of genuine moral dilemmas (through considerations of such cases as Sophie's Choice); antitheory and particularism in ethics. We will also read T.M. Scanlon's new book exploring the relations between moral permissibility, intention, meaning, and blame. The course is designed to provide a sophisticated and up-to-date background in normative ethical theory, well-grounded in the contemporary literature, which can then be taken and applied to a wide variety of moral issues.
Course Requirements:
(i) Regular, active participation in seminars.
(ii) Take home midterm exercise. Distributed 9/24, Due 10/1.
(iii) Short critical paper (6-8 pages, typed, double-spaced). Due 10/29.
(iv) Final paper (roughly 15 pages double-spaced) on a topic of your choice from any part of the seminar. Due Tuesday, 12/15, NOON. I suggest consulting with me well ahead of time about your topic, and going over a detailed outline at some point.
Note: Suggested (but not required) paper topics will be provided for the short critical paper, which should focus on selected articles from the assigned reading or other articles I recommend or you bring to me. You may either focus on one article or critically compare two or three, perhaps defending one author against objections from another, or formulating objections you think another author might raise, etc. The longer final paper will allow you more room to depart from the texts, if you wish, and to explore further some of the issues in a systematic way, perhaps developing and defending your own views or your own solutions to the puzzles--though there should still be ample grounding in and reference to the literature.
Approximate Grading Breakdown:
Midterm exercise: 20%
Short paper: 25%
Final paper: 45%
Seminar participation: 10%
Tentative Schedule:
Aug. 27: General introduction to normative ethics; methodology.
Sept. 3: Do the distinctions between killing and letting die or between intended harm and merely foreseen harm ground non-consequentialist constraints? (We will focus mainly on the former distinction this week; the latter will come up again when we discuss the Doctrine of Double Effect later.)
Sept. 10: Thomson (old and new) on the "Trolley Problem".
Sept. 17: NO SEMINAR (I will be away). WE WILL MAKE THIS UP ON READING DAY, DECEMBER 10, NORMAL TIME.
Sept. 24: Moral intuitions and moral psychology: philosophical and empirical.
Reading: (1) Michael R. DePaul, "Intuitions in Moral Inquiry" (OH), (2) Kamm: short selection from the introduction to Creation and Abortion, on methodology; (3) Jonathan Haidt, "The Emotional Dog and its Rational Tail"; (4) Joshua Greene, "The Secret Joke of Kant's Soul"; (5) Peter Singer, "Ethics and Intuitions". Further recommended reading: Kwame Anthony Appiah, Experiments in Ethics (Harvard University Press, 2008), chap. 3; Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, "Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology" (in Metaethics After Moore, Horgan and Timmons (eds.), Oxford University Press, 2006); Frances Kamm, "Moral Intuitions, Cognitive Psychology, and the Harming-versus-not-aiding Distinction," Ethics 108 (April 1998).
l Take home midterm exercise distributed.
Oct. 1: Virtue ethics.
Reading: (1) Julia Annas, "Virtue Ethics" (OH); (2) Christine Swanton, "A Virtue-Ethical Account of Right Action," Ethics 112 (Oct. 2001). Further recommended reading: Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford University Press, 1999); Robert M. Adams, A Theory of Virtue (Oxford University Press, 2006).
l Midterm exercise due.
Oct. 8: The situationist challenge to virtue ethics.
Oct. 15: CLASS CANCELED
Oct. 22: Consequentialism.
Reading: (1) David Brink, "Some
Forms and Limits of Consequentialism" (OH); (2) Paul Hurley, "Does Consequentialism Make Too
Many Demands, or
None at All?" Ethics 116, July
2006; (3) David Sobel, "The Impotence of the
Demandingness Objection" (Philosophers'
Imprint, 2007). Further Suggested Readings: There is an
excellent list of readings on consequentialism starting on p. 8 of the
following syllabus
from Doug Portmore.
Oct. 29: Non-Consequentialism.
Nov. 5: Kantian ethics.
l Short paper due.
Nov. 12: Moral dilemmas.
Reading: (1) Simon Blackburn, "Dilemmas: Dithering, Plumping, and Grief"; (2) Thomas Hill, "Moral Dilemmas, Gaps, and Residues." Further Recommended Reading: Thomas Nagel, "War and Massacre" (in his Mortal Questions), which gives an interesting defense of dilemmas.
Nov. 19: The Doctrine of Double Effect and Physician-Assisted Suicide.
Nov. 26: Thanksgiving Break
Dec. 3: Intention, permissibility, and meaning.
Dec. 10: Blame.
[[[NOTE:
We are cutting the final original topic, "Antitheory, theory, and practice,"
though anyone who is interested is encouraged to look at the reading:
Reading: (1) Mark Lance and Margaret Little, "Particularism and Antitheory"(OH); (2) Gerald Dworkin, "Theory, Practice, and Moral Reasoning" (OH). Further Recommended Reading: For more on moral particularism, see Jonathan Dancy, Ethics Without Principles (Oxford University Press, 2004); Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge, Principled Ethics (Oxford University Press, 2006).]]]
Dec. 15, NOON: Final Paper Due
I will suggest additional recent articles as we go along, which may be
useful for generating paper topics. Here are just a few more up front:
Matthew Hanser, "Why Are Killing and Letting Die Wrong?" Philosophy and Public Affairs (JSTOR)
Michael Otsuka, "Killing the Innocent in Self-Defense," Philosophy and Public Affairs (JSTOR)
Paul Hurley, "Agent-Centered Restrictions: Clearing the Air of Paradox," Ethics 108 (Oct. 1997)
Samuel Scheffler, "Doing and Allowing," Ethics 114 (Jan, 2004)
Ben Bradley and Michael Stocker, "Doing and Allowing" and Doing and Allowing (a discussion of Scheffler's article)
FitzPatrick, "The Intend/Foresee Distinction and the Problem of Closeness," Philosophical Studies.
Douglas Portmore, "Position-Relative Consequentialism, Agent-Centered Options, and Supererogation," Ethics 113 (Jan. 2003).
Alastair Norcross: "Consequentialism and the Unforeseeable Future," Analysis, Oct. 1990.