the liberal commitment to pluralism, there is a tension between liberalism and pluralism.

I find Kekes's book a thoughtful, timely, and compelling attempt to explicate and defend ethical pluralism. Kekes argues in considerable detail and yet is constantly able to keep the broad facets of the debate with dogmatism and relativism in the reader's mind. The Morality of Pluralism is a good example of a book that discusses an important theoretical area of ethical and political theory in a manner that is accessible to intelligent undergraduates and yet inviting and deeply interesting to professional philosophers.

Uma Narayan
Vassar College


This collection consists of twenty-three new essays by leading philosophers on a wide range of topics in ethics. The essays tend to focus on or contribute to debates at the cutting edge of their subjects. There may be no moral philosopher in a position to assess the value of all of these essays. In my opinion, seven of the essays are first-rate—those by Railton, A. Baier, Feinberg, Kagan, Korsgaard, Sinnott-Armstrong, and Irwin. Most of the rest are strong. Only some seem weak or uninteresting.

Instead of discussing the substance of the papers, a task for which I would be qualified in only some of the cases, I will focus this review on the nature and motivation of the collection.

What is the purpose of this collection? The editor states (in the preface) that the series "aims to publish original essays by foremost thinkers in their fields, with each volume confined to a main area of philosophical research." As such, the series joins others with a similar aim, such as Midwest Studies in Philosophy and Philosophical Topics.

Though the authors of these essays are all "known," they are not obviously the foremost thinkers about ethics. I was easily able to think of more than a dozen extremely influential moral philosophers who did not contribute to this volume. None of the contributors to the volume teaches outside of the United States, suggesting a certain provincialism. Since information about the series never includes advice for those who would like to contribute to future announced volumes, it is clear that the authors were all solicited. The editor is not a moral philosopher, so a list of potential authors was presumably formulated in consultation with the members of the editorial advisory board of the series, three of whom are moral philosophers. Two of those three contributed papers to the collection, as did four of their colleagues from their home departments.

In my mind this raises the question of why all the papers (indeed, any of the papers) are solicited. What is the advantage of this over publicly soliciting papers for blind review? Perhaps there are some famous philosophers who
will not publish papers unless they are solicited. But none of the authors in this
collection seems to be of that sort, and in any case that would not justify soliciting
more than a few of the essays. Sometimes essays are solicited because the essays
stem from a conference or because the editor wishes to mold the volume in a
certain way—by either covering certain topics or getting responses from certain
people. But none of these considerations seemed to be operative in this case.
Although essays in the volume do fall under a wide range of topics in ethics (they
are divided into the following sections: “Moral Explanation and Justification,”
“Normative Ethics,” “Kantian Ethics,” “Ethical Naturalism,” “Consequentialism,”
“The Will,” and “God and Ethics”), there are important topics that receive little
or no coverage, and the coverage within the sections is quite uneven, as some
of the papers have rather limited interest. Indeed, a volume of this size probably
could not give adequate coverage to a full range of important topics in ethics.
Also the editor made no attempt to have papers that connect with one an-
other—none of the papers is written in the light of any of the other papers.

The opinion pages of several recent issues of the Proceedings and Addresses
of the American Philosophical Association have included discussions of whether
leading journals in the field are biased in their selection of authors and papers.
Whether or not any journals are vulnerable to that charge, it seems that this
series is. Since the editor seems to have had no special purpose in mind except
to publish a number of high-quality essays on a wide range of topics within
ethics (and other fields, for other volumes in the series), it is unclear why the
usual procedures of public solicitation and blind reviewing were not used.
The only explanation would seem to be that this method saves the editor and
his advisory board a good deal of work.

This series simply functions as a new journal, without the procedural
standards we would expect from a well-edited journal. (If the volume were
to be judged as a book, it would never be accepted for publication by a standard
publisher, for it lacks the focus required of a collection, and, therefore, it lacks
an audience other than journal readers.)

So why does this volume (and series) exist? The essays are generally of
high quality. If the volume had not been published, would the papers have
remained unpublished? Probably, most would have appeared somewhere else,
squeezing out things of lesser quality. Some may not have been published. Is
there a need for more general philosophical publishing space? I am not aware
of anyone who would argue that there is high-quality work going unpublished
for lack of publishing space. Certainly, there is no financial incentive for a
series like this. It is hard to imagine this book being useful or used for classes,
as it is neither comprehensive nor focused. It is rather like a whole volume
of this journal. Indeed, in the preface the editor cites the “essential financial
support” of his university’s administration. If universities are able to make it
in the interests of publishing companies to publish such series, then there is
no economic feedback mechanism to exercise influence. Perhaps the editor’s
university sees this series as a way of increasing its visibility in the academic
world. But in my opinion it is doing no service to the profession. Philosophers
cannot very well be expected to decline invitations to publish papers without
review (though perhaps a dozen well-known ones did); therefore, the only
remaining control would seem to be the editorial board. How active a role
should a board be expected to take in overseeing a publishing venture like this?
I hope it will not seem improper to raise these questions in a journal devoted to ethics.

JAMES C. KLAGGE
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University


This book argues that Aristotle’s ethics is a branch of Aristotelian science and uses this argument as part of its support for taking primary *eudaimonia* to be an exclusive end—study (*théoria*). It is also filled with a number of interesting suggestions about passages and issues central to Aristotelian science, ethics, psychology, and metaphysics.

According to Reeve, scientific knowledge is knowledge demonstrated from first principles, knowledge of which is *nous*. Rather than a self-guaranteeing form of intuition, *nous* is the recognition of the truth in *endoxa*, beliefs that are reliable because they are based on experience. This truth is revealed by dialectic, through the resolution of *aporiai* to which the *endoxa* give rise. The necessity of first principles arises from necessary connections between universals that exist in the world. First principles are justified by the experience underlying the *endoxa* and by dialectic. Unconditional scientific knowledge is of what is universally and necessarily true, and its objects are matterless. Plain science is of enmattered objects and is of what is true for the most part (chap. 1, secs. 1–2, 4–6, 9–10).

Ethics admits of both plain and unconditional scientific knowledge, the latter because its first principle (primary *eudaimonia*) is study, the essentially matterless activity of *nous*. Ethical first principles rest on habituation rather than induction alone, because ethics aims at practical knowledge, something that involves both true opinion and correct desire. Their content is revealed by the dialectical arguments of the *Nicomachean Ethics (NE)* (chap. 1, sec. 3–4, 7–9).

As Reeve interprets them, the *NE* i.7 conditions of completeness, self-sufficiency, and most choiceworthiness are measures of intrinsic value, and they support taking *eudaimonia* to be an exclusive end (chap. 3, sec. 21). For example, *eudaimonia* is not made better by the addition of goods because it already contains all intrinsic goods; it is a limit beyond which the addition of any further good is not good (pp. 120–22). The function argument tells us that *eudaimonia* is an activity (*energeia*) in accord with the most complete virtue—that virtue sought only for its own sake (chap. 3, secs. 22–23). Since *NE* vi.12–13 tells us that *phronēsis* is sought for the sake of wisdom (chap. 2, sec. 17), primary *eudaimonia* is activity in accord with wisdom—study. This is confirmed by Aristotle’s description of primary *eudaimonia* in *NE* x.7–8 in terms of a life devoted to study (chap. 4, sec. 28). However, this conclusion is not as extreme as it sounds. Study comprises only part of the life of a human being, lived by only part of that person, his or her *nous*. The *eudaimonia* enjoyed by a full human being is primary plus secondary *eudaimonia* (pp. 158–59, 192)