<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<Under Construction>>>>>>>>>>>>

D. Mayo Publications

Books:

• Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science, co-edited with Aris Spanos, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

• Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1996. (1998 Lakatos Prize)

                    Preface

                    Chapter 1

                    Chapter 2

                    Chapter 3

                    Chapter 5

                    Chapter 7 Perrin

                    Chapter 10

                    Chapter 11

                    Chapter 13

• Acceptable Evidence: Science and Values in Risk Management, co-edited with Rachelle Hollander, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

General Philosophy of Science:

• Mayo, D. (2010). "Error, Severe Testing, and the Growth of Theoretical Knowledge" in Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science (D. Mayo and A. Spanos eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 28-57.

• Mayo, D. (2010). "Can Scientific Theories be Warranted with Severity? Exchanges with Alan Chalmers" in Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science (D. Mayo and A. Spanos eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 73-87.

• Mayo, D. (2010). "Towards Progressive Critical Rationalism: Exchanges with Alan Musgrave" in Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science (D. Mayo and A. Spanos eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 115-124.

• Mayo, D. (2010). "An Ad Hoc Save of a Theory of Adhocness? Exchanges with John Worrall" in Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science (D. Mayo and A. Spanos eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press:155-169.

• Mayo, D. (2010). "Sins of the Epistemic Probabilist: Exchanges with Peter Achinstein" in Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science (D. Mayo and A. Spanos eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 189-201.

• Mayo, D. (2010). "Explanation and Testing: Exchanges with Clark Glymour" in Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science (D. Mayo and A. Spanos eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 351-363.

• Mayo, D. (2010). "Error and the Law: Exchanges with Larry Laudan" in Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science (D. Mayo and A. Spanos eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 397-409.
• Mayo, D. and Spanos, A. (2010). "Introduction and Backgound" in Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science (D Mayo and A. Spanos eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1-27.

• Mayo, D. and Miller, J. (2008). "The Error Statistical Philosopher as Normative Naturalist" Synthese 163(3): 305.

• Mayo, D. (2006). "Critical Rationalism and Its Failure to Withstand Critical Scrutiny," in C. Cheyne and J. Worrall (eds.) Rationality and Reality: Conversations with Alan Musgrave, Kluwer Series Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, Springer: The Netherlands: 63-99.

• Mayo, D. (2005). "Evidence as Passing Severe Tests: Highly Probable versus Highly Probed Hypotheses" in P. Achinstein (ed.), Scientific Evidence, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore: 95-127.

• Mayo, D. (2005). “Peircean Induction and the Error-Correcting Thesis," in R. Mayorga (guest ed.) Peirce-spectives on Metaphysics and the Sciences, Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: 299-319.

• Mayo, D (2004). "Models of Error and the Limits of Experimental testing," in M. Carrier, g. Massey, and L. Reutsche (eds.) Science at Century's End: Philosophical Questions on the Progress and Limits of Science. Pittsburgh-Konstanz Series in the  Philosophy and History of Science. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press: 179-188.

• Mayo, D. (2003). "Severe Testing as a Guide for Inductive Learning," in H. Kyburg (ed.), Probability Is the Very Guide in Life. Chicago: Open Court: 89-117.

• Mayo, D. (2002). "Novel Work on Problems of Novelty? Comments on Hudson." Studies in History an Philosophy of Modern Physics 34: 131-134.

• Mayo, D. (2002). "Theory Testing, Statistical Methodology, and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge," in P. Gardenfors, J. Wolenski, and K. Kijania-Placek (eds.) "In the Scope of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, (Volume 1 of the 11th International Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, Cracow August,1999). Dordrecht: Kluwer: 171-190.

• Mayo, D. (2000) "Experimental Practice and and Error Statistical Account of Evidence," in D. Howard (ed.), Symposia Proceedings, Philosophy of Science 67: S193-S207.

• Mayo, D. (2000). "Models of Error and the Limits of Experimental Testing" in M. Carrie (ed.) Science at Century's End: Philosophical Questions on the Progess and Limits of Science, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press: 317-344.

• Mayo, D (2000). "Science, Error Statistics, and Arguing From Error" in N. Shanks and R. Gardner (eds.) Pozen Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 71, Amsterdam: Rudopi: 95-111.

• Mayo, D (2000). "What is This Thing Called Philosophy of Science?" Review Symposium of A. Chalmers' What is This Thing Called Science?, Metascience 9: 179-188.

• Mayo, D. (1999). "Making Progress with Laudan's Problems: 1977-1997," in Progress and Its Problems After 20 Years. The National Autonomous University of Mexico (in Spanish).

• Mayo, D. (1997). "Duhem's Problem, The Bayesian Way, and Error Statistics, or 'What's Belief got To Do With It?'" and "Response to Howson and Laudan," Philosophy of Science 64(1): 222-244 and 323-333.

• Mayo, D. (1997) "Error Statistics and Learning from Error: Making a Virtue of Necessity," in L. Darden (ed.) Supplemental Issue PSA 1996: Symposia Papers, Philosophy of Science 64: S195-S212.

• Mayo, D. (1997). "Severe Tests, Arguing From Error, and Methodological Underdetermination," Philosophical Studies, 86 (3).

• Mayo, D. (1996). "Ducks, Rabbits, and Normal Science: Recasting the Kuhn's-Eye View of Popper's Demarcation of Science," The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47: 271-290.

• Mayo, D. (1994). "The New Experimentalism, Topical Hypotheses, and Learning From Error" in D. Hull, M. Forbes, & R.M. Burian, Proceedings of the 1994 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association.

• Mayo, D. (1993). "The Test of Experiment: C. S. Peirce and E. S. Pearson," in E. Moore, ed., Charles S. Peirce and the Philosophy of Science, Tuscaloose: University of Alabama Press.

• Mayo, D. (1991). "Novel Evidence and Severe Tests," Philosophy of Science, 58 (4): 523-552. Reprinted (1991) in The Philosopher's Annual XIV: 203-232.

• Mayo, D. (1988). "Brownian Motion and the Appraisal of Theories," in L. Laudan, R. Laudan, and A. Donovan Scrutinizing Science.. Dordrecht: Reidel: 219-243.

• Mayo, D. (1987). How Everyone Can Have a Rare Property: Response to Sober on Frequency-Dependent Causation." Philosophy of Science 54: 266-276.

• Mayo, D. (1986).  “Cartwright, Causality, and Coincidence,” PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Volume One: Contributed Papers: 42-58

• Mayo, D. (1986). "Understanding Frequency-Dependent Causation," Philosophical Studies 49: 109-124.

Philosophy of Statistics:

• Mayo, D. and Spanos, A. (forthcoming) "Error Statistics" in Philosophy of Statistics , Handbook of Philosophy of Science (eds D. Gaabbay, P. Thagard, and J. Woods) Elsevier (approx. 30 pages).

• Mayo, D. (2010). "An Error in the Argument from Conditionality and Sufficiency to the Likelihood Principle" in Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science (D Mayo and A. Spanos eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 305-14.

• Cox D. R. and Mayo. D. (2010). "Objectivity and Conditionality in Frequentist Inference" in Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science (D Mayo and A. Spanos eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 305-14.

• Mayo, D. (2008). “How to Discount Double-Counting When It Counts: Some Clarifications,” British Journal of Philosophy of Science, 59: 857–879.

• Mayo, D. and Cox, D. R. (2006) "Frequentists Statistics as a Theory of Inductive Inference," Optimality: The Second Erich L. Lehmann Symposium (ed. J. Rojo), Lecture Notes-Monograph series, Institute of Mathematical Statistics (IMS), Vol. 49: 77-97.

• Mayo, D. and Spanos, A. (2006). "Severe Testing as a Basic Concept in a Neyman-Pearson Philosophy of Induction" British Journal of Philosophy of Science, 57: 323-357.

• Mayo, D. (2005). "Philosophy of Statistics" in S. Sarkar and J. Pfeifer (eds.) Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia, London: Routledge: 802-815.

• Mayo, D. and Spanos, A (2004). "Methodology in Practice: Statistical Misspecification Testing,” Philosophy of Science 71: 1007-1025.

• Mayo, D. (2004). "An Error-Statistical Philosophy of Evidence" in M. Taper and S. Lele (eds.) The Nature of Scientific Evidence: Statistical, Philosophical and Empirical Considerations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 79-118.

• Mayo, D. (2003). "Could Fisher, Jeffreys and Neyman have Agreed? Commentary on J. Berger's Fisher Address." Statistical Science 18: 19-24.

• Mayo, D. and M. Kruse (2001). "Principles of Inference and Their Consequences," in D. Cornfield and J. Williamson (eds.) Foundations of Bayesianism. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishes: 381-403.

• Mayo, D and Spanos, A. (2000) "A Post-data Interpretation of Neyman-Pearson Methods Based on a Conception of Severe testing. Measurements in Physics and Economics Discussion Paper Series, History and Methodology of Economics group. The London School of Economics and Political Science. London: Tymes Court.

• Mayo, D. (1998). "Commentary: Some Problems With Chow's Problems With Power," (Discussion of Siu Chow's  Statistical Significance) Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21: 212-213.

• Mayo, D. (1992). "Did Pearson Reject the Neyman-Pearson Philosophy of Statistics?" Synthese 90: 2233-262.

• Mayo, D. (1985).  “Behavioristic, Evidentialist, and Learning Models of Statistical Testing,”Philosophy of Science, 52(4):493-516.

• Mayo, D. (1983). "An Objective Theory of Statistical Testing." Synthese 57(2): 297-340.

• Mayo, D. (1982). “On After-Trial Criticisms of Neyman-Pearson Theory of Statistics,” PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Volume One: Contributed Papers:145-158.

• Mayo, D. (1981). "The Foundations of Statistics as a Tool for Technology Studies," Nature and System 3: 109-114.

• Mayo, D. (1981).  “In Defense of the Neyman-Pearson Theory of Confidence Intervals,” Philosophy of Science, 48(2): 269-280.

• Mayo, D. (1980). "Testing Statistical Testing," in J. Pitt (ed.) Philosophy of Economics. Dordrecht: reidel: 175-203.

• Mayo, D. (1980).  “The Philosophical Relevance of Statistics,” PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Volume One: Contributed Papers: 97-109

Philosophy of                              Specific Sciences, Risk & Policy:

• Mayo, D. (2008).  “Some Methodological Issues in Experimental Economics,” Philosophy of Science, 75: 633–645.

• Mayo, D. and Spanos, A. (2008). "Risks to Health and Risks to Science: The Need for a Responsible 'Bioevidential Scrutiny,'" Biological effects of low Level Exposures, Newsletter 14(3): 18-22.

• Mayo, D. and Spanos, A. (2006)."Philosophical Scrutiny of Evidence of Risks: From Bioethics to Bioevidence, Philosophy of Science 73(5): 803-17.
   
• Mayo, D. and Spanos, A. (2004). "Commentary: When Can Risk-Factor Epidemiology Provide Reliable Tests?"  Epidemology 15: 527-528.

• Mayo, D. (1991). "Sociological vs Metascientific Views of Risk Assessment" in D. Mayo and R. Hollander (eds.) Acceptable Evidence: Science and Values in Risk Management,  New York: Oxford University Press: 249-279. Reprinted (with modifications) as "Sociological versus Metascientific Views of Technological Risk Assessment" in K. Shrader-Frechette and L. Westra (eds.) Technology and Values Rowman & Littlefield (1997).

• Mayo, D. (1988).  “Toward a More Objective Understanding of the Evidence of Carcinogenic Risk,” PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers: 489-503.

• Mayo, D. and N. Gilinsky (1987). “Models of Group Selection,” Philosophy of Science, 54(4): 515-538.

• Mayo, D. (1986). Understanding Frequency-Dependent Causation" Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 49: 109-124.

• Mayo, D. (1985). "Increasing Public Participation in Controversies Involving Hazards: The Values of Metastatistical Rules,"Science, Technology, and Human Values 10(4): 55-68.

• Mayo, D. (1983). "Against a Scientific Justification of Animal Experiments," in H. B. Miller & W. H. Williams Ethics and Animals, Clifton: New Jersey: Humana Press: 339-359.