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DAVIDSON’S TROUBLES WITH SUPERVENIENCE

INTRODUCTION

It is well-known that Donald Davidson denies the possibility of psycho-physical laws. By ‘psycho-physical’ he seems to mean both laws having mental states as initial conditions and physical states as consequents (properly called ‘psycho-physical’), and laws having physical states as initial conditions and mental states as consequents (which I shall call ‘physico-psychical’). Interest in Davidson’s denial has primarily focused on his rejection of psycho-physical laws and the attendant irreducibility of the mental to the physical.

But I wish to focus on Davidson’s denial of physico-psychical laws, for he combines this with the assertion of supervenience of the mental on the physical. As he puts it:

There cannot be two events alike in all physical respects but differing in some mental respects...¹

By examining this combination of positions we can learn something about Davidson’s views and we can learn something about supervenience. It will be my contention that we have misunderstood both.

1. DAVIDSON’S TROUBLES

Richard Hare has charged that Davidson’s combination of positions is inconsistent. According to Hare:

Supervenience brings with it the claim that there is some ‘law’ which binds what supervenes to what it supervenes upon.²

And Hare has gone on to chastise Davidson³ for appropriating the term ‘supervenience’ to denote an apparently mysterious relationship (between the mental and the physical) when, according to Hare, it

denotes a perfectly clear and non-mysterious relationship. I will examine the justice of this terminological charge in Section 5. Let us begin with the substantive charge of inconsistency.

From Davidson's notion of supervenience there must be some (perhaps exhaustive) characterization of an event in physical terms such that any event having that characterization will have the mental property had by the original event. This gives a true universal generalization connecting the mental to the physical. Is this inconsistent with Davidson's denial of physico-physical laws? That all depends on what is meant by 'law'. This important point is obscured by Hare, who seems to want to use 'law' and 'universal proposition' interchangeably.

Davidson never denies the possibility of true universal generalizations connecting the mental and the physical. What he denies is that such generalizations can support counterfactuals and that we can know any such particular generalizations to be true. Terminology aside, Hare has not shown that Davidson's supervenience brings with it a claim to counterfactual-supporting generalizations.

Hare further asserts that if Davidson holds the generalizations to be universal but not nomological, then he is committed to:

the possibility that our mental states have been uniformly correlated with our own and other people's physical states up to now, but that one day soon the correlation might simply collapse.

But this confuses the issue of whether connections might have been different with that of whether they might become different. Davidson, who endorses the former possibility, is in no way committed to the latter. Indeed, Davidson explicitly denies the latter possibility when he further characterizes supervenience as the view that:

an object cannot alter in some mental respects without altering in some physical respects.

So there is no simple inconsistency in advocating supervenience and anomalism.

Jaegwon Kim has affirmed their consistency by attributing to Davidson what he calls 'weak supervenience':

In any given possible world, if two events in that world are alike in all physical respects, then they are alike in all mental respects.

This weak form of supervenience supports no counterfactuals. If the physically indiscernible events had been in different possible worlds
from each other (i.e., if at least one of them is counterfactual), they might yet have been mentally discernible.

But even if Davidson's views are not inconsistent, there is something to be gleaned from Hare's attack. Supervenience does at least commit one to the necessary existence of universal generalizations connecting the mental to the physical (physico-psychical generalizations), even if not to the existence of necessary ones. Although Davidson accepts the possibility of such generalizations, he does not seem to be aware of their inevitability. It remains to ask why there should, or how there could, inevitably be universal generalizations in a domain where there are no laws. This further difficulty is urged against Davidson by Simon Blackburn.

Since, according to anomalism, universal generalizations do not support counterfactuals, people in different possible worlds who have the same physical characteristics may have different mental characteristics. But according to supervenience, these people cannot occupy the same possible world, since this would defeat the universal generalizations.

Why is this? If, as Davidson holds, the divergent commitments of the mental and the physical undermine the possibility of physico-psychical laws, one is left wondering why they do not undermine supervenience as well. There is no contradiction here, as Hare alleged, but there is a mystery, according to Blackburn.

The sense of mystery is not dispelled by Davidson's favorite analogy with the relationship between truth and syntax in a formal system. The analogy is imperfect. The analogy is useful for providing a model for irreducibility. But all that irreducibility establishes in the context of the mental is anomalism about connections from the mental to the physical (i.e., psycho-physical). Davidson goes beyond this in claiming anomalism about connections from the physical to the mental (i.e., physico-psychical). Yet formal systems are nomological in their connections from syntax to truth, because truth in a formal system is necessary truth. So it remains a mystery why there should be universal but anomological generalizations from the physical to the mental.

Davidson's allusion to G. E. Moore's view of the moral is similarly unhelpful, since Moore combines irreducibility of the moral with (at least) nomological connections from the natural to the moral.

Could Davidson simply limit his anomalism to the psycho-physical, while allowing physico-psychical laws? Not obviously, for his argument for anomalism derives from the divergent commitments of the mental
and the physical,\textsuperscript{19} and this suggests there are no grounds for differential handling of the two directions.

2. A PROBLEMATIC SOLUTION

There is, according to Blackburn, an explanation of this mystery, but it is not an explanation with which most advocates of mental supervenience would be happy.

Davidson tends to speak of mental events as though they are things in the world: They are (token-)identical with physical events, and they causally interact with physical events. This realist impression is reinforced by Davidson's appeal to Moore in formulating supervenience.\textsuperscript{20} For Moore's views are thoroughly realistic. But this impression may be in certain respects misleading. Attention to Davidson's views in the philosophy of language reveals the tension. The features of the mental that tend to make anomalism plausible derive from constraints upon our interpretation of other people. We ascribe beliefs and desires to people, in part, as a way of understanding, predicting, and appraising their behavior.\textsuperscript{21} Thus, the mental becomes more a way of seeing people than it is something in people that can be seen.\textsuperscript{22} And this aspect of Davidson's views pulls away from his seemingly realistic conception of the mental.\textsuperscript{23}

Once we appreciate the interpretational (or ascriptive) aspect of Davidson's view of the mental, the universal generalizations become easy to explain in the presence of anomalism. A mental theorist interprets others in light of some, possibly unarticulated, or not fully articulated, scheme of interpretation. Suppose a person who exhibits a certain pattern of behavior and physical states is interpreted as having a certain set of mental characteristics. Then some principle must lie behind this interpretation such that any person who exhibits the pattern would be interpreted as having that set of mental characteristics. Methodological consistency demands that the principle be applicable to all cases exhibiting the pattern.\textsuperscript{24} Thus, for a given theorizer, there will be universal generalizations connecting the mental to the physical (i.e., physico-psychical).

Davidson notoriously follows Quine in endorsing the indeterminacy of translation and interpretation.\textsuperscript{25} Indeterminacy of interpretation implies that no one interpretive scheme can be shown to be superior to all others. So other theorizers may well employ other schemes, just as
a given theorizer may have employed a different scheme. But given that a person is going to theorize, the person must employ just one interpretive scheme, which ensures that, from the perspective of that theorizer, there will be universal generalizations. The theorizer cannot (consistently, qua theorizer) judge two physically indiscernible events to be mentally discernible. Thus, supervenience is secure. But since the theorizer’s particular scheme did not have to be used, the physico-psychical generalizations will not support counterfactuals and so are anomalous.

The reconciliation of supervenience and anomalism is bought at the cost of anti-realism about the mental.

3. THE LATENT SIDE OF DAVIDSON

The attribution of mental anti-realism to Davidson is surprising enough to require further discussion.

Despite the extensive discussion of realism and anti-realism in the last decade or so, there is no widely shared account of these notions. So any attribution of realism or anti-realism is potentially controversial. Nevertheless, we may distinguish (at least) two senses in which one may be an anti-realist:

(1) Relativism. One can be an anti-realist about certain kinds of judgments if one holds that such judgments involve predicates that are relational in a way that they are not normally recognized as being. For example, it is generally acknowledged that two events can be simultaneous only relative to a frame of reference. On this view, events are not simultaneous simpliciter. This seems to be a form of anti-realism about judgments of simultaneity. Moral relativism and subjectivism seem to take this form as well, insofar as actions can be right or wrong only relative to a moral code (of some society or individual).

In the case of judgments concerning mental states, Davidson seems to hold that people can be said to be in a certain mental state only relative to some scheme of interpretation. No one is in any mental state simpliciter. This is one sense in which Davidson might be thought to be a mental anti-realist. That Davidson is a relativist, in this sense, seems fairly uncontroversial. That such relativism constitutes anti-realism may be more controversial. Since relativism still allows for ‘facts of the matter’ and ‘truth’ (even though relative facts, and relative truth),
it might be thought that something more (or less) is needed for genuine
anti-realism. This might take the form of:

(2) *Non-descriptivism.* One can be an anti-realist about certain kinds
of judgments if one holds that such judgments do not constitute indica-
tive assertions (in which case the label ‘judgment’ may be misleading),
even though they appear to be, or are normally construed as, indicative
assertions. Judgments are not fact-stating, but serve some other func-
tion. For example, emotivists hold that moral judgments do not assert
moral facts, but express the emotions or preferences of the one making
the judgment.

In the case of judgments concerning mental states, Davidson seems
to hold that mental judgments embody a way of seeing certain beings,
rather than reflecting something in them. Mental judgments express
a determination to understand, predict, and appraise those beings using
rational criteria. This is another sense in which Davidson might be
thought to be a mental anti-realist. That non-descriptivism constitutes
a form of anti-realism seems fairly uncontroversial. That Davidson is a
non-descriptivist about the mental may be rather more controversial.

My account of Davidson’s views reveals some interesting and rather
precise parallels to Hare’s metaethical views. According to Hare, there
are no moral properties in the world. We make moral judgments about
people as a way of guiding behavior. No one set of moral principles is
forced upon a moral judge (moral indeterminacy) because of the diver-
gent commitments of moral discourse (action-guiding) and descriptive
discourse (truth-seeking). Given that a person is going to make moral
judgments, that person must, qua moralizer, employ principles consist-
tently in such a way that there are universal generalizations, from that
person’s perspective, connecting the moral to the descriptive. But
indeterminacy ensures that the generalizations will not support coun-
terfactuals.

Hare is clearly a non-descriptivist anti-realist. But is Davidson? One
might suppose that Davidson’s talk of token-identity and causal inter-
action between the mental and the physical would preclude an anti-realist
interpretation. But I do not think that is so. Hare could, for example,
be a token-physicalist about the moral: All good actions (i.e., all actions
that are called ‘good’) are themselves (identical with) physical events.
And Hare could also, thereby, endorse moral-physical interaction: That
good action, say, feeding the beggar (i.e., that action that was called
‘good’) caused the beggar’s blood sugar level to rise. Davidson may sound like a realist, but that does not make him one.

The parallel with Hare may be illuminating in another respect. Students of Davidson have long puzzled over the key idea that the mental and the physical are differentiated by divergent commitments. This idea has an analogue in Hare’s belief in the divergent purposes of descriptive discourse, which is truth-seeking, and moral discourse, which is not truth-seeking but action-guiding. In fact, Hare thinks that the indeterminacy of moral judgments derives from the fact that choice or preference are not determined by description. This is what has been called the ‘is/ought gap’: No amount of describing an action can force anyone to take up any particular attitude toward that action.

One could similarly see Davidson as insisting on (what has been called) an ‘is/thought gap’: No amount of describing an entity can force anyone to take up any particular stance in trying to understand or interact with that entity.\(^{33}\) Intentional discourse embodies a decision to treat an entity as susceptible to being predicted and influenced by rational means. The ‘intentional stance’, extensively explored by Dennett, is like the ‘moral point of view’. They are useful but ultimately optional strategies for getting on in the world. Furthermore they are broad strategies in that they admit of variations. ‘Indeterminacy’ means that they really are ‘stances’ and ‘points of view’.

4. PHILOSOPHICAL MORALS

So far I have claimed that Davidson and Hare both subscribe to indeterminacy for their respective realms. This was indeed true up to a dozen years ago, but Hare is now (virtually) a utilitarian. In particular, he holds that the logic of moral concepts entails that a utilitarian moral principle is superior to any other moral principle.\(^{34}\) Thus he has given up the latitude of choice that he previously thought morality allowed.

Davidson still, presumably, subscribes to indeterminacy of interpretation (and translation). It will help to examine what role this indeterminacy plays in his overall system.

Davidson claims that even if indeterminacy were eliminated, as he thinks it cannot be, this would not affect the irreducibility of the mental to the physical.\(^{35}\) This is not surprising. The mental would be reducible to the physical only if there were psycho-physical laws. Yet determinacy
of interpretation would at best ensure the existence of physico-psychical laws. Since physico-psychical laws do not entail psycho-physical laws, determinacy does not entail reducibility. They are more like converse notions.

What is more interesting is whether determinacy would ensure physico-psychical laws. Supervenience ensured universal physico-psychical generalizations from the perspective of each theorizer. These were not laws because they did not support counterfactuals. That is, different interpretive principles might have been employed (or, were equally well employed by others). Determinacy of interpretation would ensure that other interpretive principles could not (equally well) have been used, in the given or in other possible worlds. Thus, physico-psychical generalizations become necessary – true from all perspectives in the actual world, and true in all possible worlds that share with ours the laws of physics. So determinacy of mental interpretation would seem to imply the existence of physico-psychical laws.36 ‘Law’, in this context, however, must not be thought to have realist implications.

This is not to say that indeterminacy itself is what explains anomalism. It couldn’t: Indeterminacy concerns only physico-psychical relationships, but anomalism encompasses both physico-psychical and psycho-physical relationships. In fact Davidson holds that indeterminacy and anomalism are both explained by the diverse commitments of the mental and the physical realms. But if we imagine away indeterminacy, we imagine away what would explain anomalism, and so we imagine away anomalism.37

What are the differences among the various concepts we have been considering? Supervenience, as used by Hare and as used in my antirealist construal of Davidson, is a methodological constraint on the use of principles in making judgments: one must use them consistently. Indeterminacy is a substantive claim that more than one set of principles is equally acceptable. Anomalism is a substantive claim that no set of principles holds in all worlds that share with ours the laws of physics.

Once we take account of Davidson’s endorsement of indeterminacy, we can see that Kim’s representation of Davidson’s views is inadequate. Kim represented Davidson as holding weak supervenience. But even weak supervenience is inconsistent with indeterminacy. According to indeterminacy, different theorizers in the same possible world may with equal legitimacy use different interpretational principles. And events of a certain physical constitution can be held to have a certain mental
constitution only relative to a given interpretational principle. Indeterminacy is inconsistent with talk of how things are, *simpliciter*, even within a single possible world, for indeterminacy denies that there is any such fact of the matter.38 Weak supervenience, formulated in terms of possible worlds, is committed to facts of the matter as to what mental constitution a given event of a certain physical constitution has. It is weak only in denying that the event has to have that mental constitution (i.e., that it does have it in other possible worlds where it retains its physical constitution). Thus, indeterminacy is, in a sense, a stronger thesis than (physico-psychical) anomalism (which is consistent with talk of how things are, but not with how they must be). As far as I can see, the notion of indeterminacy cannot be adequately formalized in terms of possible worlds.39

The mistake of attributing weak supervenience to Davidson is not only Kim’s mistake. Davidson himself states his view of supervenience practically in Kim’s form.40 Davidson, too, misunderstands what kind of supervenience he can endorse.

The problem is that there are two very different notions going under the name ‘supervenience’. There is Hare’s notion that I described earlier – a methodological constraint on a theorizer – and there is Kim’s notion – a substantive constraint on the relationship of facts in possible worlds. Davidson’s views on supervenience uneasily straddle these different notions.41

5. TERMINOLOGY

Finally, let us return to Hare’s charge that Davidson has misappropriated the term ‘supervenience’ for use in the philosophy of mind. If we give Hare priority in his use of ‘supervenience’, the charge is true in one sense and false in another. Those philosophers of mind who wish to formulate a realist, non-reductive, materialist account of the mental, such as Kim and his followers, have misappropriated the term. Perhaps they should speak of ‘determination’ or ‘ontological supervenience’ instead of ‘supervenience’.42 If Davidson is one of these philosophers, as he is commonly thought to be, then he is justly chastised by Hare. On the other hand, if Davidson’s view of supervenience is as I have said it must be, then it is after all Hare’s own use.
But does Hare deserve priority in his use of ‘supervenience’? Davidson has suggested that ‘supervenience’ was first introduced as a philosophical term of art by G. E. Moore.\textsuperscript{43} If that were true, then Hare would be the usurper, since Moore’s use is more like that of Kim than like that of Hare. But, as has been widely noted, Moore never uses the term ‘supervenience’, though he uses the notion that Kim and Davidson have tried to articulate.\textsuperscript{44}

In 1952 Hare, in The Language of Morals,\textsuperscript{45} did use and explain the term ‘supervenience’ as a philosophical term of art. He has acknowledged\textsuperscript{46} that he did not originate the use, but was only following a use already familiar at Oxford. (Indeed, I am sure he would not want to be responsible for introducing the term, given the morass of confusion it has produced.) However, the ‘familiar’ use could not have been very clear, as a slightly earlier publication by fellow Oxonian J. O. Urmson\textsuperscript{47} uses ‘supervenience’, with little explanation and without endorsing it, in a sense much closer to that of Kim and Moore.

To pin down the origin more precisely would require investigating students’ and lecturers’ notes from Oxford in the post-war years. Lacking such an investigation, it seems most proper to award priority to Hare, not because he originated the use, but because he was the first to give it a reasonably clear explication.\textsuperscript{48}

NOTES

1 Davidson (1980b, p. 214).
2 Hare (1984, p. 3).
3 Hare (1984, pp. 3, 16).
4 The existence of the physical characterization is asserted in the following formula (where $x$ and $y$ range over individuals, $M$ ranges over mental properties, and $P$ ranges over conjunctions of physical properties):

$$\Box(\forall M)(\forall x)(Mx \rightarrow (\exists P)(Px \& (\forall y)(Py \rightarrow My)))$$

The claim that this formula is equivalent to Davidson’s formulation of supervenience is defended by Kim (1984, pp. 163–64).

There is a potential difficulty here created by the limits of language. It may well be impossible exhaustively to characterize in language the full, relevant character of a physical state. Language, being discrete, is capable of drawing only a denumerable infinity of distinctions, while reality, being indiscrte, is capable of generating a nondenumerable infinity of differences. From the presumed fact that mental states cannot vary unless physical states do, it does not follow that we can always formulate universal generalizations from the physical to the mental in language. (This point is not a merely epistemic
one.) But, as far as I can tell, Davidson premises none of his views on this (recherché) fact.

A further difficulty is raised by Post (1987, pp. 179–80). He argues that $P$ does not count as a physical characterization. But his argument seems to have force only where $P$ ranges over negations or disjunctions of physical properties. It is not clear how the argument is supposed to work when $P$ only ranges over conjunctions. Unlike Kim, I am not suggesting that $P$ should range over maximally consistent sets of physical properties (which could involve negations), nor am I suggesting that $P$ might range over disjunctions of conjunctions of physical properties, amounting to a reductive base.

Hare (1984, pp. 3, 15, 16).


Hare (1984, p. 16).

This sentence may need some qualification in light of Section 2, infra. See my Note 27 below.


This sentence is not strictly true, though it is true in the relevant sense: Weak supervenience does not ensure that an event of a certain physical character must have the mental character it in fact has. Yet that would have to be ensured for the generalization to be nomological.

Davidson (1980b, p. 216).


Davidson (1980b, p. 222).


Suppose, on the other hand, we consider the relationship between syntax and truth for ordinary language, which contains assertions of contingent truths and falsehoods. If we limit our attention to context-free assertions, then weak supervenience will hold for the relationship between the syntax of such assertions and their truth-values: In a given possible world all syntactically indiscernible assertions will have the same truth-value; but if things had been relevantly different (i.e., in other possible worlds), their truth-value would have been different.

This constitutes a clear example of universal yet anomalous generalizations. Indeed, Kim (1984, p. 162) interprets Davidson as offering this as his analogy. But this form of the analogy casts no illumination on the physico-psychical. Once we shift away from formal systems to (context-free) ordinary language, we import a significant feature – the world which the ordinary assertions are about and which gives those assertions their truth-values. There is nothing comparable to dispel the mystery associated with universal but anomalous physico-psychical generalizations.

Davidson (1980a, p. 253).

Moore (1922, pp. 260–75).

For example, Davidson (1980b, pp. 222–23).

Davidson (1980a, p. 253).


Davidson (1980a, p. 215; 1980c, p. 239; and 1984a, p. 154).

When Davidson discusses constraints on mental interpretation (e.g., 1980c, pp. 231, 237), they are clearly not truth-constraints (i.e., ways in which mental facts should constrain mental ascriptions) but regulative constraints. A similar regulative tendency
can be seen in Kim’s original explanation of mental supervenience (1978, p. 154). A regulative principle does not tell us what is in the nature of things – only what we must read into our investigations. Cf. Blackburn (1985, p. 61) and also his discussion of how moral supervenience might be explained in Blackburn (1971, pp. 114–15).

It is important to remember that Davidson’s claims about the mental are limited to propositional attitudes and their ilk. He has not extended his theory to pains and sensations. Presumably ascriptions of pains are not answerable to constraints of rationality. So far, then, Davidson could be a realist who rejects anomalism regarding pains and sensations.

25 Davidson thinks the scope of indeterminacy is narrower than Quine supposes (1984a, p. 154).
27 Davidson (1984b, p. 159). Having called John unhappy, a mental theorizer may go on to call twin-John unhappy, but only if the theorizer has changed her mind about the proper interpretive principle to employ (or has deepened her knowledge of twin-John’s non-mental characteristics). In either case she could not continue to insist John was happy. Harry Lewis (1985, p. 169) has called attention to this dynamic character of interpretation, which Davidson himself insists upon (1980b, p. 223). An object could ‘alter’ in some mental respects without altering in any physical respects if, in the meantime, the interpretive theory being used was revised or replaced. Consistency can only be required relative to the use of a given interpretive theory. To exclude the possibility of interpretational evolution would be foolish: Then consistency would become the hobgoblin of little minds.

28 A theorizer will, of course, see his interpretive scheme as applying to both actual and hypothetical cases (see, e.g., Hare 1952, p. 153), and so, in a sense, the scheme will support counterfactuals. But the sense is internal to the scheme. Since the use of the scheme is itself contingent and, to a certain extent, arbitrary, the internal sense of nomologicality turns out to be a delusion. Evaluating judgments by using a particular scheme is not the same thing as evaluating judgments at a particular possible world.
29 This paper hereby elaborates and substantiates the qualms about Davidson’s views that I alluded to in Note 4 of Klagge (1988).
30 For a survey of, and a perspective on, this vexing issue, see Sayre-McCord (1986).
31 Cf. Wittgenstein’s remark (1968, p. 178): “My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul. I am not of the opinion that he has a soul”.
32 Hare (1984, p. 3).
33 The epithet comes from Sayre-McCord (1988, p. 435), who, however, curtly dismisses the possibility of mental non-descriptivism (Note 4, p. 453).
34 Hare’s fullest argument for utilitarianism is given in his (1981), especially chapter 6. However, Hare is concerned to acknowledge (1981, pp. 138–86) that nothing forces a person to use moral concepts or language at all, so his argument is not a refutation of amoralism. The moral point of view is ultimately optional. Nevertheless, according to Hare’s current views, if one goes in for moral theorizing, one is constrained to be a utilitarian. There is no moral indeterminacy.
36 Just as Hare acknowledges the possibility of the amoralist, we may wish to acknowledge
the possibility of the solipsist. The solipsist does not go in for mental theorizing about others, even others admitted to be physically indistinguishable from himself. Perhaps the inference in the text depends on the exclusion of solipsism. The intentional stance is also ultimately optional.

37 Davidson (1984a, p. 154).
38 Davidson (1984a, p. 154).
39 I argued for a similar conclusion in a somewhat different context in my (1987).
41 I have tried to distinguish these two notions in a broader context in my (1988).
42 The case for the label of ‘determination’ is rehearsed by Post in (1987, pp. 181–82).
43 In my (1988) I have used the label ‘ontological supervenience’, renaming Hare’s notion as ‘ascriptive supervenience’.
44 Davidson (1980a, p. 253).
45 Moore (1903, pp. 27, 35, 124; 1922, p. 261).
46 Hare (1952, pp. 80–81, 145, 153).
47 Hare (1984, p. 1).
48 Urnson (1950, p. 155).
49 Earlier versions of this paper were presented at Vanderbilt University in February, 1988, and at the Central Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association in Cincinnati, Ohio in April, 1988. The discussions that followed were very helpful. The paper has been gradually improved by specific comments from Richard Hare, Harry Lewis, Brian McLaughlin, John Post, and Geoffrey Sayre-McCord.

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