search strategies. What the statistical methodologist can do is these triggering mechanisms explicit. In so doing we would un- nd at last how by carrying out certain experimental procedures, cal models are approximated sufficiently so that—whether one ; it or not—the limit theorems of statistics are working their

/ splitting up the inquiry appropriately, the possible irregularities nstrained to be related to known patterns of variability. By learn-)out these, we learn about experimental phenomena—about would be expected to happen with certain frequencies whenever 1 experimental conditions are fulfilled. This is the basis of experi- l knowledge. Such experimental knowledge resembles what meant by the "experimental purport" of hypotheses. If there is mental knowledge to be had of a phenomenon, then it will be able by means of these methods. The ability to make successful tions, our success in obtaining experimental knowledge, is ex- d by the error-statistical properties of our methods. We make ess in experimental knowledge—experimental knowledge —because we have methods that are manifestly adequate for ng from errors.

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Index